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Abstract 
Things and events are fundamental entities in Davidson’s ontology. Less distinctly are the
ontological status of properties, especially mental types. Despite of some eliminative
allusions weighty reasons to understand Davidson’s philosophy of mind as including
intentional realism. With it the problem of mental causality arises. There are two striking
solutions: the epiphenomenalism of mental properties and the downward causation of
mental events. Davidson cannot accept either. He claims to justify mental as supervenient
causality in order to integrate it thus into physicalism (his version of monism). But his
argument prove at best the explanatory, not the causal relevance of mental properties. For
that and other reasons Davidson fails the aspired synthesis of a sufficient strong
physicalism and the autonomy of the mental; a project whose realization is hard to
achieve any how.  Anomalous Monism and Mental Causality 5
1 Davidson tones down AM (1970: 224). He intends to show only that mental events
which are causally related to physical events are also physical. But usually AM is
understood without this restriction and even expanded to a general monism, for which  all
causally connected events are physical events (Davidson 1987: 45; Kim 1998: 93). General
monism follows from NC and the assumption that all strict laws are physical laws.  
1.  Preliminary Remarks
Davidson’s philosophy of the mental, first outlined in his classical article “Mental
Events” (1970), is of particular interest because anomalous monism is a challenge for
materialism in contemporary philosophy. Anomalous monism indeed denies the
existence of spiritual  substances and pure mental events  but Davidson nevertheless
emphasizes that a “complete understanding of the workings of body and brain would
not constitute knowledge of thought and action” (1973: 251). No wonder that such
a position creates irritation within the mainstream of materialism. 
Davidson’s writings also initiated a still ongoing debate on mental causality. The
main question is if and how can the mental play a causal role within the framework
of  a materialist ontology. Central aspects of this debate make up the second and
third section of this essay. First we present some presuppositions for the problem of
mental causality as it emerges with Davidson‘s philosophy of  mind. 
The core of Davidson’s philosophy of  mind can be seen as centered around three
principles (CI, NC, MA). From these the thesis of anomalous monism (AM) is
concluded (Davidson 1970: 208-9, 1974: 231). The principles are:
The principle of causal interaction (CI):   
Some mental events interact causally with physical events. 
The principle of the nomological character of causality (NC): 
Causal relations between events are necessarily governed by strict laws.
The principle of mental anomalism (MA):
Mental events cannot be subsumed under strict laws.
Together with the additional assumption that all mental events stand in causal
relations and these causal relations are governed only by strict physical laws AM
follows: all mental events are physical events.
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1  See capt. 3. 
2  A Kim-event itself can have various properties and can therefore be described in many
ways but this differs from the way Davidson-events allow for several descriptions. Only the
constitutive property of events is exemplified by the substance of the event. Events are
identical iff all their corresponding components are identical. If, for example, a person x
has a particular pain of type M at time t that is also correlated at t with a neuronal state of
type N, and M and N are constitutive properties, then we have one and the same event
only in case the condition M=N is satisfied. Token identity therefore implies type-identity
within fine grained conceptions. A coarse grained Davidson-event in contrast can fall
under several different types or concepts even if these are not coextensive. Davidson
(1969: 179-80) identifies events iff they have the same causes and effects.
Yet mental events cannot be explained completely in a physical way because MA
implies that mental properties or concepts generally cannot be reduced to physical
properties or concepts (Davidson 1970: 213-14). AM asserts the identity of mental
and physical event tokens but not an identity of types. It is an ontological monism
combined with a conceptual and explanatory dualism (Davidson 1997a: 7)
1.
To assert token identity and to reject type identity presupposes a coarse grained
concept of events. Davidson (1967: 137) characterizes events as particulars, as
unrepeatable and dated entities. They are individuals that belong to the ontologically
indispensable equipment of the world. The causality of events is “. . . the cement of
the universe; the concept of cause is what holds together our picture of the universe,
a picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and the
physical” (Davidson 1980: xi). Davidson’s coarse grained conception of events differs
from fine grained notions. Kim (1976), for example, defines fine grained events as
exemplifications of a constitutive property by a substance at a certain time. That is,
for him events are structured entities consisting of three components: substance,
constitutive property and time. If we speak of events in the following pages we
assume only a coarse grained conception.
2
We use the term “physicalism” here in line with the current philosophical trend
– and in contrast to a pure linguistic interpretation – primarily as an ontological
term. Thus, we see no major difference between „physicalism“ and “materialism”.
Kim (1989a, 1993: 373-74, 1997: 185) often uses both terms synonymously.
Davidson uses the adjective “physical” often in a wide sense.  Whether a vocabulary
or a description is physical is to be fixed “relative to the mental . . . so to speak
recessive . . .” (Davidson 1970: 211) All statements without intentional terms that
are about corporal (spatiotemporal) phenomena are in a broad interpretation
physical. Besides that Davidson also uses a narrower concept of the physical inspired
by the natural sciences. Physical entities are entities being described in the
vocabularies of the natural sciences. We therefore accept with the term “physical” a
certain indetermination. This does not irritate, if we assume that the vocabulary ofAnomalous Monism and Mental Causality 7
specific sciences except for intentional terms can be reduced in principle to physical
concepts. It is also to note that the concept of natural law is ambiguous. It can be
understood linguistically as a statement of law and also in a non-linguistic way as an
objective state of affairs to which such statements refer. The context in which we use
the expression will make its meaning transparent enough.
Davidson characterizes a strict law as “a generalization that was not only “law
like” and true, but was as deterministic as nature can be found to be, was free from
caveats and ceteris paribus clauses; that could, therefore, be viewed as treating the
universe as a closed system” (Davidson 1993: 8, see also 1970: 219, 1974: 230; on
the problem how far our ideal theory is deterministic in nature, see 1970: 219) On
the other hand, ceteris-paribus-laws (CP-laws) are only valid if certain conditions are
satisfied that cannot be specified at the moment or in principle.
It follows from Davidson’s realistic interpretation of natural sciences that a true
universal and closed physical theory implies the ontological principal of the causal
closeness of the physical world (CclW). Its supposition is of decisive significance for
the question whether and how AM can embrace mental causality.
In contrast to CI and NC Davidson has argued for MA by using three strategies:
applying the principle of charity, insisting upon the relevance of causal concepts in
sciences with an intentional vocabulary and using the external individuation of the
content of propositional attitudes. The first strategy embraces arguments aiming at
the essential difference between mental and non-mental phenomena based upon
different synthetic a priori laws. Via applying the principle of charity the
identification and ascription of propositional attitudes is settled by standards of
rationality, especially coherence, consistency and truth. Therefore, mental and
physical concepts belong to heterogeneous vocabularies. Since Davidson requires the
homogeneity of the descriptive terms as a necessary condition for strict lawfulness
psycho-physical laws cannot be strict in principle. An approximation of psychology
to the natural sciences would therefore mean “changing the subject” (Davidson
1970: 216) The peculiarity of the mental is indicated for Davidson also by two
further features: its specific holism and causal nonclosure. 
However, most of these theses are contested up to this day. For S. Yalowitz
(1998), for example, Davidson’s rationality-arguments are not well suited for the
establishment of MA, rather they support the indispensability of intentional
psychology. Thus he agrees only with Davidson’s second strategy. It rests on the view
that concepts of propositional attitudes have to rely on causal concepts and as such8 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1  Of course, such a strategy can only be upheld if there are strong arguments for the view
that all laws in natural sciences, or at least the fundamental ones, are indeed unrestricted
universal laws. Although still widely shared by most philosophers there have lately been
attempts to paint another picture. See for example N. Cartwright (1999). If she is right,
then universality of laws can’t be the dividing line betweeen the natural sciences and the
special sciences like psychology. All laws then, even the fundamental ones in the natural
science, are ceteris paribus laws in her view.
2 Causal forces are often identified with dispositions or with their realizers, if we interpret
dispositions as functional properties. There are different views on the relation between
properties and causal forces: 1. dispositionalism identifies (at least some) properties with
causal forces. 2. categorialism makes a distinction between both, 3. a synthesis between both
they are dependent on aspects and interests. Therefore generalizations with causal
terms can only be CP-laws and are suspended in nature science.
1 
The third strategy brings into play that the content of intentional states is at least
partially determined by external states and conditions. They do not need to be
exclusively determined by neuronal states and processes. “We are therefore free to
hold that people can be in all relevant physical respects identical while differing
psychologically: this is in fact the position of “anomalous monism” . . .” (Davidson
1986a: 453). 
We denote the conjunction of the three premisses as P, the core of Davidson’s
theory as AM+P and these together with the thesis of weak supervenience as
AM+P+WS.
2. The Critique of Property-Epiphenomenalism and Counterarguments
Davidson’s view was presumably that AM+P gives an adequate explanation of mental
causation. Certainly AM excludes an epiphenomenalism of mental events. They
instantiate by their identity with physical events also physical properties. Thereby
mental events also fall under strict physical causal laws and stand in the relation of
cause and effect. But some commentators and critics were not satisfied with this
answer, for example, T. Honderich 1982, E. Sosa 1984 and J. Kim 1989. The main
thesis of their objections and interpretations of Davidson’s philosophy of the mental
is: the causal efficiency of mental events does not guarantee that mental events as
mental, that is, by their mental properties, are causally efficient (relevant). Quite the
contrary, because causal relations between two events c and e are governed by strict
physical laws only their physical properties are causally relevant. Only such
properties, some authors express it in this way,  give instantiating events their causal
power.
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views ascribes to properties a dispostional and a categorial feature (see Armstrong 1997:
Capt. 5). 
Empiristic-instrumentalistic views try to dismiss expressions like “causal forces“ if
understood literally as misleading. Such forces should be reduced instead to natural laws.
A realist view understands a causal force as a real entity that can form the basis of different
laws; see, par example, B. Ellis 2002: 47seq., capt. 3, 7.
From MA and NC it is therefore possible to conclude an epiphenomalism of
mental properties. For the critics just this is not compatible with CI and thus the
consistence of the three principles as the main point of Davidson’s theory becomes
doubtful. Two alternatives seem possible: on the one hand one could abandon MA.
Then CI and the strengthening of NC to CclW would lead back to the older identity
theory. J. Hornsby (1993) on the other hand prefers to abandon with NC the
physicalistic component of AM + P and by that the inference to psycho-physical
token-identity (AM).
Davidson (1970, 1973, 1974) does not dispute the epiphenomenalism of mental
properties. Later some authors have challenged the claim that it follows from MA
and NC. Finally Davidson (1993) has a critical look with his critics. In this debate
we recognize three strategies to extend  AM+P in different ways:
1. The range of laws backing causal relations is widened by CP-laws, in particular
CP-laws with mental predicates (Fodor, McLaughlin): enlargement of nomological
reasoning. 
2. Causal relations are analyzed via counterfactuals (T. Horgan, E. Lepore and B.
Loewer): counterfactual analysis.
3. Mental causality is taken to be an example of supervenient causality (Davidson
1993, Kim in his earlier work, par example, 1984). 
These strategies to rehabilitate mental causality do not exclude each other. There are
also combinations of these strategies. We will discuss whether and how far these
proposals really refute the objection of property-epiphenomenalism and make clear
that the mental does some causal work.  
(a) Enlargement of Nomological Reasoning
A necessary condition for the success of this strategy is the distinction between real
and non-real CP-laws. With the latter we could not justify singular causal relations
because such laws do not satisfy necessary conditions of lawfullness, for example, the
condition of possible falsification, by referring to missing CP-conditions. Fodor10 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
(1989: 72) emphasizes the CP-feature of our best intentional laws. But he believes
that in particular universes of application the CP-conditions can be satisfied and
therefore such conditions together with antecedence conditions and laws are
sufficient to explain the corresponding effects especially of behavior. That was
objected to with regard to psychological laws and therefore such a proposal motivated
different revisions of the truth-conditions of CP-laws. But this is not our topic here
(see the short sum of Earman and Roberts 1999: 458-59).
We make in our context the simplified assumption that the lawfulness of the
relevant CP-laws is not disputed. Furthermore we initially presuppose that there are
mental and physical properties (universals or tropes) or at least classes. Finally,
Davidson itself often speaks of properties or types. We will discuss this in section
three of this article. 
McLaughlin (1989: 121, 124seq.) reconstructs the objection of property-
epiphenomenalism as a conclusion from three premisses: 
1.  NC implies the following principle of exclusion: events stand in causal
relations “only in virtue of falling under strict laws“ (125). The latter property is
understood by Davidson’s critics as the sole causal relation-making property.
Therefore the exclusion principle can be formulated as a biconditional: events stand
in causal relations iff they fall under a strict causal law. 
2. The principle of exclusion implies that only strict nomological properties are
causally efficient. 
3. MA implies that no mental property is nomological in a strict sense. 
From these theses one can conclude:
4. NC and MA imply that no mental property is causally efficient.
McLaughlin disputes this argument because he does not agree with the first premise.
NC does not exclude that causal relations between two events are governed by non-
strict causal laws or counterfactual dependencies, provided that such events fall in
addition also under strict laws. By this he upholds a version of non-reductive
physicalism. At the end of his article (131) he emphasizes therefore the causal
priority of physical properties together with the thesis of global supervenience. Two
causally possible worlds W and W’ with the same physical properties have also the
same causal properties. McLaughlin (1983) analyzes in a model of supervenient
causality the dependency of causal non-physical properties on physical properties. 
Fodor (1983) also does not accept the mentioned principle of exclusion. He is
not satisfied with the mere possibility of mental causality like McLaughlin but he
believes in the reality of this causality: “. . . if it isn’t literally true that my wanting isAnomalous Monism and Mental Causality 11
causally responsible for my reaching . . ., then practically everything I believe about
anything is false and it’s the end of the world” (77). On the other side laws of special
sciences like laws in psychology are not fundamental. Such laws indicate causal
mechanisms but they do not articulate them. This is only possible in the
development of more basic sciences. CP-conditions also refer to such mechanisms.
For Fodor the ultimate causally relevant factors are physical mechanisms (in the
narrow sense of the word). If this were true then all mental causes would be physical
causes. Fodor wants a synthesis between mental causality and physicalism. But he
seems to see the logical tension between both. If a synthesis were not possible he
would prefer to give up physicalism. 
Kim (1992a, 1993a, 1996: 226 seqq., 232-33) has emphasized the
incompatibility between both assertions also with respect to Fodor. Psycho-physical
causation is essentially downward causation that is an essential feature (of strong
versions) of emergentism. Such causality is not compatible with a respectable
physicalism. The location of all causal mechanism on a physical level excludes mental
causality in principle, also an independent psychology provided that it aims at
autonomous causal explanations. Therefore Kim regards non-reductive physicalism
that claims to connect both as an inconsistent proposal.
Can the rejection of the principle of exclusion ensure the possibility of mental
causality in the framework of AM +P ? 
It is helpful to discuss this problem within the following model. 12 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1 This restriction considers Kim’s (1998: 45) remark that given a minimal change of the
physical constitution of our world there could be a conflict with CclW, for example, e1 has
the physical property P’1 instead P1 but furthermore the mental property M1. M1 is then
under certain circumstances a part of the cause of P2.
P- respectively M-properties are physical respectively mental properties. The pure
physical event e0 with P0 causes the psycho-physical event e1 with P1 and M1; e1
causes e2 with P2 and M2. For a systematic analysis it is advantageous to divide our
leading question in two parts: Is (a) psycho-physical causality and (b) is psychic
(psycho-psychical) causality possible? We presuppose with AM that P1 … M1 und P2
… M2.
1. Assume that e1 as an instance of M1 is a sufficient cause of e2 as an instance of
P2. For that we use the abbreviation “M1 causes P2”. We use similar abbreviations in
analogous cases. This assumption contradicts CclW. Moreover P 1 would be an
overdeterminated cause of P2. CclW excludes also the possibility that M1 is merely a
partial cause and that it only together with P1 is sufficient for P2. Nonetheless causal
overdetermination of P2 by M1 is reconcilable with CclW in our world.
1 Most authors
refuse such overdetermination because it would make psycho-physical causality and
explanations superfluous in principle. There are also other versions, for example,
identity theories, theories of local reduction or attempts to use the concepts
determinant/determinable, but all these versions are not consistent with AM+P and
they exclude autonomous mental causality. 
2. The assumption of psychical causal sequences, for example as in “M1 causes
M2”, is coherent with CclW. Within the nomological model of causality there must
be a lawlike connection between M1 and M2. If we assume strong or weak
supervenience (on these concepts see (iii), in this article) of M- on P-properties the
causal-lawlike connection between M1 and M2 requires that the basis-properties of
M1 (P1, P’1, P’’1 . . .) should stand only in causal-lawlike relations to the basic-
properties of M2 (P2, P’2, P’’2 . . .). Yet this may not be valid in all cases. P’1 could
stand in a causal-lawlike relation, for example, to P3 that belongs to the basic-
properties of M3. In this case the M1 and M2 connecting hypothesis would be
falsified, for example, “vx(M1x 6 wy(M2y))”. There remains only the possibility that
P1 causes M2. This epiphenomenalist interpretation is a genuine alternative to the
concept of mental causation from a theoretical point of view even in the case where
we have psycho-psycho regularities. We could exclude such a proposal only by the
causal closeness of the mental like in Spinoza’s concept of attributions. But today this
account will find scarcely followers. The epiphenomenalist interpretation has the
advantage of a larger unification because at least the antecedence links of the causal
M-sequences must be P-causes. We would need only one sort of laws to explain M-Anomalous Monism and Mental Causality 13
1 Whether properties and theories can be reduced depends essentially on allowing for weaker
or stronger concepts of reduction. It depends for example on whether we allow for
disjunctive properties or not.
instances. In contrast to that the concept of psychical causality is more in harmony
with commonsense views. 
Could propositional attitudes themselves cause behavior that is described in an
intentional way? Is, for example, my belief that there are still tickets for a
performance of the ninth symphony of Gustav Mahler in the Frankfurt Opera and
the desire to hear the symphony the cause that I will go to the box office  and buy a
ticket? Is this a particular sort of mental causality that is coherent with AM+P
because such causality is not in conflict with CclW? First we have presupposed
properties – mental and physical – to be real entities that exist independently from
our descriptions and interpretations. Yet this is not the case with intentional
properties of actions. They are merely results of interpretations and express causal
descriptions of behavior  in a commonsense fashion. Davidson argues similarly also
in this way (1991: 163). If causal relations are real entities then actions cannot be
caused as instances of intentional properties. 
If we assume emergent non-mental properties then the question is justified: could
behavior as instances of such properties be caused  by mental events? But this is not
a question in any way for AM+P because it is not assumed that there are such
emergent properties. In fact Davidson (1973: 246) hesitates when it comes to the
factual feasibility of reducing biology and neurophysiology to physics.
1 Yet, thereby
emergent properties and causal forces obviously are not assumed. For Davidson
(1987: 45) emphasizes that he knows no theoretical ground to exclude the reduction
of special sciences to physics with the exception of disciplines that ascribe
propositional attitudes. This presumably means that a reduction to physics is possible
in principle if causal concepts and CP-laws are eliminated in the further course of
scientific development and replaced by descriptions of causally relevant mechanisms.
Therefore, this is not a change in the subject under study in difference to all sciences
that use an intentional vocabulary (Davidson 1991: 163). In Davidson’s theory
mental properties are also not emergent in any case not in strong sense if we assume
that their instances have not effects like in the model of downward causation. 
The first strategy to rehabilitate mental causality leads us to a meager result.
Consistent with CclW are only particular cases of mental causality. But this
possibility is also refuted by Kim (1993a: 351seq., 1996: 229, 1998: 41seq.), if we
require the realization of mental by physical properties. 
The concept of realization is significant in the contemporary debate on the mind-
body problem in particular in connection with non-reductive versions of materialism.14 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1 Identity then can be seen as a special or limit case of realization. Functional properties
refer conceptually (analytically) to any realizer. For materialism such realizers can be only
physical properties. In the case of unique realization functional and realizing properties are
identical on logical grounds. D. Lewis (1994: 418seq.) defines functional predicates as
definite descriptions and for that reason he interprets such predicates as non-rigid
designators. Therefore Lewis can state also identity in the case of multi-realization.
Some authors interpret realization as a stronger connection than mere dependency on
natural laws. E. Lepore and B. Loewer (1989: 179), for example, require in addition that
the realized phenomenons and the laws governing them are to be explained by basis- and
bridge laws. The latter and also the realized properties are nevertheless thought of as
“brute facts” provided they cannot be interpreted by logical or methodological reasons as
identities of realizing and realized properties. 
Realization of mental by physical properties replaces their identity. This is also an
attempt to distance oneself from emergentism. Yet the concept of realization is an
ambiguous one (see J. Heil 1999: 190). We restrict the universe of the relata to
properties and interpret the relation of realization – following Heil – in a broad sense
as an asymmetrical, simultaneous determination or dependence. The relation can be
specified further especially in respect to its modal status giving rise to contingency or
lawlike, metaphysical or logical-analytical necessity.
1 The latter is valid also for the
relation of supervenience. But this relation is not an asymmetric one. 
Kim (1996: 232) nevertheless urges the strong similarity between both and
presupposes that they are identical in their philosophical significance.  His refutation
of mental causality is – in terms of above model – : 
 * Assume, M1 is a sufficient cause for M2. Because M2 is realized by P2
respectively is supervenient over P2, P2 is also sufficient for M2. 
This is for Kim “unstable”. Between both theses there is “a real tension”. Kim
believes the solution of this problem is the assumption that M1 can cause M2 only if
M1 also causes the realizer of M2, that is, P2. Mental causality is only possible
together with psycho-physical causality. This presupposes downward causation and
just this is in conflict with CclW. 
A. Marras (2000: 143seq.) – we think he is right – has objected against Kim that
we have in this case two different dependencies that are not in any conflict because
the relations of realization respectively supervenience are interpreted as a rule not
causally. This is also Kim’s view (1998: 44). But in his above argument the causal
interpretation of these relations seems to be really at work because it can be
understood as a refutation of inadmissible overdetermination. On the other hand
Kim has emphasized recently (1998: 9 seq.) that the explanatory power of
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other more fundamental relations. Here among others causal relations will play a role
(see also Heil 1998: 150-51).
We thereby see clearly that causal relations and the relations of realization
respectively of supervenience do not compete within explanations. Surely, Kim is
right if he, for the justification of his argument,  says that a direct causal connection
between mental states of different people is not acceptable in common knowledge as
well as in science. For it requires physical links. However, this does not contradict
the above explanations. In them it was pointed out that the first links of causal M-
sequences must have P-causes. As for the rest if we make the assumption of CclW,
every mental causation with intermediate physical links is excluded. Yet mental
causation between M-states of the same person, for example, the causation of desires,
hopes, fears by beliefs is not disputed and even a component of the functional
definition of mental states. The definition includes that mental states do not only
stand in causal relations to inputs and outputs but also to other mental states. 
(b) The Couterfactual Analyses 
Lepore and Loewer (1987) give an explanation of mental causality that is not
discussed in detail in contemporary philosophy. If this account were successful we
would have a justification of mental causality within a modified framework of AM+P.
They assume that critics of Davidson do not distinguish two different concepts of
causal relevance of properties: causal relevant1 and causal relevant2. We use symbols in
the following way:  individual variables: “x”, “y”; individual constants: “a”, “b”, “c”,
“e”; predicate variables: “f”, “f*”, “g”; predicate constants: large Latin letters. “K(x, y)”
is a dyadic, “K*(x, f, y, g)” is a tetradic causal relation (see definition I and I*). “p”
and “q” (also with indices) designate propositions. “Ox” means “x occurs”, “>” is the
counterfactual implication.
The properties f and g are causally relevant1 iff it is true that there are f- and g-
instances and a strict law from which we can conclude that  f-instances cause g-
instances. It is obvious that mental properties cannot be causally relevant 1 within
AM+P.
(I) x’s being f is causally relevant2 to y’s being g iff
1. x causes y 
(K(x,y))
2. fx and gy16 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
(in Lewis’ semantics we conclude from that: fx>gy)
3. If were not the case that fx, then it would not be the case that gy
(¬fx>¬gy)
4. fx and gy are logically and metaphysically independent. 
          
T. Horgan (1989: 50, 58-59) refers to a similar defined concept as quausation.
Lepore and Loewer (1989: 189) modify under this name (I): 
(I*) x’s being f is quausally related to y’s being g iff
1. x occurs and has the property f.
(Oxvfx)
y occurs and has the property g.
(Oyvgy)
Sometime before x occurs and we accept the following conditionals:
2. If x would occur and be f, then that would cause y to be g.
(Oxvfx > K*(x, f, y, g))
3. If x would occur but not be an f, then it would not cause an event that is  g. 
(Oxv¬fx >¬wyK*(x,¬f,y, g))
A precise definition requires some further conditions like 
4. in (I) – “K” is an extensional predicate but not “K*” because in sentences
containing it like “K*(a, P, b, Q)” the substitution salva veritate of predicates “P” and
“Q” by co-extensive predicates “P’” and “Q’” is not guaranteed. 
Lepore and Loewer take on Lewis’s interpretation of the truth-conditions of
counterfactual conditionals, such is, the proposition p>q is true iff either there are no
possible p-worlds or p-worlds with q are more similar to the actual world as p-worlds
without q. Lewis (1973: 164seq.) analyses a counterfactual concept of causality
relying on the concept of counterfactual dependency. We give a little abridged
description here. c1, c2 . . . and e1, e2 . . . are two families of events such that any two
c’s and any two e’s exclude each other mutually. Counterfactual dependence of the e-
events on the c-events exists iff the propositions Oc1>Oe1, Oc2>Oe2, . . . are true.
Causal dependency (or direct causation) of the event e from the event c is defined then
as counterfactual dependency of the family Oe, ¬Oe on the familiy Oc,¬Oc, that is,
iff the propositions Oc>Oe and ¬Oc>¬Oe are true. Single causal dependencies can beAnomalous Monism and Mental Causality 17
1  For critical examination of the counterfactual analysis of causality see, for example, F. von
Kutschera (1993: 43 seq.)
2 p1, p2 . . . and q1, q2 . . . are two families of alternative propositions. L is a set of true
statements of law-propositions, F a set of true propositions of singular facts or conditions
of application. For Lewis nomical dependency of q-propositions from p-propositions in
virtue of L and F holds iff L and F imply all material implications p16q1, p26q2 . . . He calls
a proposition r counterfactually independent of a family p1, p2 . . . iff r is true independent
of the truth-value of the p-propositions so that the conditionals p1>r, p2  > r . . . are true.
From both premisses (a) “the q-propositions are nomically dependent on the p-
propositions” in virtue of L and F and (b) “all elements of L and F are counterfactually
independent from the p-propositions” the counterfactual dependency of the q- on the p-
propositions (p1>q1, p2>q2 . . .) can be explained. Because of (b) this is in harmony with
Goodman’s result above mentioned.
combined to form a causal chain. Lewis defines with this concept the predicate
“cause”: x is a cause of y iff a causal chain leads from x to y. 
The terms causal relevant2 and quausation are mainly synthetic constructions from
different causal concepts: the causal relations “K” respectively “K*” and causal
dependency counterfactually definied. Yet this still is a controversial concept.
1 Like in
the writings of Davidson’s critics these terms are essentially used with reference to
properties of events. In any case their introduction is a remarkable modification of
AM + P. Davidson (1967a: 159seq., 1993: 6) accepts only the two-digit causal
relation K and neither a four-digit causal relation with reference to properties nor an
intensional causal junctor.
N. Goodman (1955) has shown that counterfactual conditionals and their
negations do not follow from strict laws and further non-counterfactual statements.
From this one can conclude – like Lepore and Lower emphasize – that causal
relevance2 of mental properties is compatible with AM+P. But it is not shown thereby
whether such properties are factually causal relevant2. Lepore and Loewer (1987:
640-41) mainly refer to Lewis’ (1973) nomological foundation of counterfactual
conditionals (pi>qj).
2 The reasoning of statements containing mental (M-) and
behavioral (B-) respectively neuronal (N-) predicates, for example, “Mic>Bje“, “¬Mic>
¬Bje”, requires psychophysical CP-laws. For Lepore and Loewer the discovery and
systematization of psycho-behavioral laws is the task of psychology within the
framework of AM+P. 
These authors accept the principle of global supervenience: “If two nomologically
possible worlds are exactly alike with respect to fundamental physical facts (the facts
expressible in terms of the vocabularies of fundamental physical theories) then they
are exactly alike with respect to all other facts” (1989: 177-78). But global
supervenience does not guarantee that mental properties are supervenient over18 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1  Lepore and Loewer (1987: 638) try to satisfy Kim’s and Sosa’s formulations by the
following sufficient condition of causal irrelevance2: (II) If x has the property f* and „(f*x
v ¬fx) > gy“ is non-empty true, then x’s being f is causally irrelevant2 to y’s being g. By
contraposition and adding it to (I) a stronger concept of causal relevance2 is defined: (III)
x’ being f is causally relevant2 to y’ being g iff the conditions in (I) are satisfied and x has no
property f* so that “(f*xv¬fx) > gy” is non-empty true. If we substitute for the variables x,
neuronal properties (178, 189). Therefore it is possible that M-instances are not
connected with N-instances and therefore also not with B-instances by a causal laws.
In such cases we have the problem again: what is the foundation of the correspondent
counterfactual conditionals?
Kim (1989a: 277) has emphasized that global supervenience is to weak to express
in an adequate way the dependence of the mental on the physical demanded by
physicalism. It does not exclude that two worlds differ physically only in a minimal
way, for example, by a small displacement of a particular hydrogen atom, but could
be psychologically different at all. What possibilities exist is dependent essentially on
the definition of the universe of possible worlds. It is dependent on, for example,
whether the definition includes all logical or nomological possible worlds or all
worlds corresponding to the natural laws of our world. We can eliminate strange
cases, like Kim has described, if we approximate the concept of global to that of
strong supervenience. R. C. Pauli and T. Sider (1992), for example,  add subsets of
individuals of possible worlds and also unit sets to the universe of possible worlds.
Yet these authors also emphasize that strong supervenience itself does not exclude
bizarre psycho-neuronal dependencies. Their possibility again depends on how the
universe of possible worlds is framed. A world with a creature that differs physically
only in a minimal way from James Miller but “has no mind” (842) is not
nomologically possible from our point of view, if we interpret the known
dependencies between mental and neuronal states as laws of nature. 
Let us make the assumption that the conditions 1 - 4 in (I) are satisfied for c and
e and the predicates Mi and Bj so that Mic is causally relevant2 to Bje. Is this a real
refutation of the objection of property-epiphenomenalism? Or is it a mere pseudo-
refutation and consistent with that objection? E. Sosa (1984: 277-78) states it
counterfactually: if the psychophysical event c with the properties Mi and Nr would
be replaced by the pure physical (neuronal) event c* with Nr but without Mi, then in
both cases the same behavior Bje would be caused .. In accordance with that Kim has
written : “. . . anomalous monism entails this: the very same network of causal relations
would obtain in Davidson’s world if you were to redistribute mental properties over its
events any way you like; you would not disturb a single causal relation if you randomly
and arbitrarily reassigned mental properties to events, or even removed mentality entirely
from the world” (1989a: 269).
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y, f*, f, g the constants c, e, N, M, B, we obtain (S) “(Ncv¬Mc)>Be”. The truth of (S) is –
according to (II) – a sufficient condition of causal irrelevance2 of Mc with regard to Be.
This seems to correspond with the meaning of Sosa’s and Kim’s formulations. By
substitution we have as well (T)“(¬NcvMc) > Be”. Lepore and Loewer urge that (T) is in
harmony not only with AM + P and (S) but is also true in the case of multirealization.
Assuming a strict law between N and B we have following Lepore and Loewer a non-
desirable consequence: “It (that is (II), the authors) renders even properties connected by
strict laws causally irrelevant2“ (639). Factually we have only in certain situations in which
M is not realized by N but by other neuronal properties N*, N** . . . causal irrelevance2 of
Nc with regard to Be. As a possible realizer of M N is not causally irrelevant2 in all
nomological possible situations (according to (II)). Besides that we can prevent results of
substitution like (T) if we substitute for “f”, “f*” and “g” only mental, neuronal and
behavioral predicates. This is justified because the conditions of causal irrelevance of
mental, not of neuronal, properties are to be analyzed. It might be emphasized that all
these considerations do not refute Kim’s and Sosa’s objections.
For Lepore and Loewer (1987: 638) both statements are consistent:  “¬Mic>¬Bje”
and “Nrcv¬Mic>Bje”. This is also true for the other conditions (1, 2, 4) of (I).
Therefore Mic is causally relevant2 to Bje. Obviously the concept of causal relevance2
is to weak to refute the epiphenomenalism of mental properties. Nevertheless for
Lepore and Loewer (841) the counterfactual dependency of certain P-(N- or B-
)events on M-events offends CclW when it comes to properties. With it they assume
tacitly a stronger concept of mental causality than causal relevance2 that is used in
ordinary language and also presupposed by Davidson’s critics. “¬Mic>¬Bje” does not
imply “Nrcv¬Mic>¬Bje”. Both sentences are likewise merely logically consistent. 
Yet Lepore and Loewer (1989: 178) are also physicalists. They accept therefore
the priority and lawfulness of physical causality, such is, Davidson’s NC, and
emphasize against Fodor: “As far as we can see an event’s causal powers are completly
determined by their basic causal properties. Content properties are not needed for
that. However, if <c, F> is quausaly related to <e, G> then there is a perfectly good
sense in that c’s having F makes a difference to c’s causal powers” (190). But this
difference cannot stem from causal forces that are identical with the mental property
F or are an aspect of this property (see p. 5, Fn 1) because the causal forces of events
are only determinated by their physical properties. The difference can only exist on
the basis of lawlike  connections, for example, of laws of supervenience between F
and subvenient physical properties (P1, P2 . . .). If F is replaced by the mental
property F’ a change to the subvenient physical properties (P1’, P2’ . . .) and their
causal forces takes place. Pycho-physical laws with M-concepts in their if-component
which connect beliefs and pro attitudes with behavior are therefore no causal laws.
But in most cases we have no other explanations of behavior. In Lepore’s and
Loewer’s physicalism mental properties could not be causally relevant in the ordinary20 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1  On tbe concept of supervenience see. for example, Kutschera 1992; on the concept of
Humean supervenience Preyer, Siebelt 2000a. 
sense but in an explanatory way. If we mix both it seems that mental causality fits in
the framework of non-reductive physicalism. Mental properties have in psycho-
behavioral laws also a heuristic function. Such properties indicate often non-
discovered physical properties which do the whole causal work (Kim 1993a: 354).
Lepore and Loewer try to reconcile commonsense views of mental causality and
Davidson’s physicalism (comprehensiveness of physics, event-monism,
supervenience, NC). But the problem is whether such a synthesis is possible in
principle. No doubt notions like causal relevance2 are consistent with physicalism but
the question is whether they can express the ordinary views of mental causality in an
adequate way. Such causality implies downward causation and just this is not in
harmony with CclW. 
(c) Supervenient Causality
Davidson’s doctrine is: “Supervenience in any form implies monism; but it does not
imply either definitional or nomological reduction.” (1993: 5)
1 He believes thus
reductions of mental to physical concepts by explicit definitions or biconditional
bridge laws can be rejected in harmony with the supervenience thesis; supervenience
“does not imply the existence of psycho-physical laws” (7). AM is in opposition to a
Cartesian substance and an event dualism. This is made possible by a coarse grained
concept of events. Usually AM is primarily understood as a negative thesis, too weak
and underdetermined to yield positive descriptions of the psychophysical relationship
we would expect from a solution of the mind-body problem (see, for example, Kim
1998: 5-6). For Lepore and Loewer (1989) AM  is also only a “fairly tepid
physicalism”, that is even consistent with emergent causality and does not itself
imply the supervenience of the mental. The hint to it in Davidson (1970: 214) is
presumably an approach to give a positive description required by physicalism. All
relations of supervenience are not asymmetrical, therefore in addition the possibility
of a reverse supervenience of the physical over the mental must be excluded. 
Aside from the already mentioned global supervenience (GS) we find in the
philosophical writings in particular the concepts of weak and strong supervenience
(WS, SS) that are defined for properties and other entities like Kim-events and
propositions. The definitions for properties start out from two families of properties,
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properties (A1, A2 . . .). The operator of necessity N can be interpreted as logical-
analytical, metaphysical, or nomological. It is useful for many purposes to define WS
and SS in the following way: 
(WS) A weakly supervenes on B iff
Nvf,Avx(fx6wg,B(gxvvy(gy6fy)))
(SS) A supervenes strongly on B iff
Nvf,Avx(fx6wg,B(gxvNvy(gy6fy)))
Davidson gives the following characterization: “. . . a predicate p is supervenient on
a set of predicates S if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be
distinguished by S” (1993: 4). If we interpret this as necessary thesis, the
characterization is equivalent to another often used definition of WS:  
(WS*) Nvxy(vg,B(gx:gy)6vf,A(fx:fy))
From  WS follows WS*, from WS* follows WS only if we make the additional
assumption that B is a complete Boolean algebra, that is, it contains to every property
its negation and to every plurality of properties its conjunction. 
SS differs from WS by a second necessity operator N before the last implication.
This implies a stronger modal connection between the A- and the B-properties
within SS. The relation between them holds not only like in WS restricted to our
world, but, for example, in all nomologically possible worlds. Therefore regularities
of the form vy(Biy6Ajy) are laws of nature. This may be the reason why Davidson
(1993: 4, Fn 4) opts for WS. He believes that it is not in conflict with MA. Yet this
collides  with his externalism that individuates propositional attitudes partially by
external factors. Therefore, propositional attitudes must not supervene over brain
states –  even  if they could vary – like in WS – from world to world. Externalism is
coherent only with GS except we expand in WS and SS the basis of supervenience by
relational properties that concern  relationships between organisms and their
environment and history (see Kim 1987: 87). 
For Davidson (1993) the second task of supervenience is the justification of
mental causality. The epiphenomenality of mental properties is in fact in harmony
with AM+P, but following Davidson not with WS that takes the role of a further
premise. From AM+P+WS he concludes the causal efficience of mental properties.
This proposal underlies also his answer to Kim’s counterfactual objection of
property-epiphenomenalism  (see (ii)). If Kim were right – Davidson has answered –,
then AM+P would not be in harmony with every sort of mental supervenience. But
for WS this is not the case. The critical  point in Davidson’s response is the asserted22 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1   See on the distinction between categorial and dispositional aspects of properties page 5
Fn 1.
incompatibility of the causal irrelevance of mental properties and their
supervenience. WS would be therefore the guarantee of mental causality.  
Davidson reasoning is: the weak supervenience of mental properties implies that
two different mental events are to  be distinguished also in their physical properties.
He presupposes such properties to be causally effective. Then he concludes:
“psychological properties make a difference to the causal relations of an event, for
they matter to the physical properties, and the physical properties matter to causal
relations” (Davidson 1993: 14). Yet mental causality cannot be justified in this way.
To show this one must assume not only that the physical but also that the
supervenient mental properties “matter to causal relations”. But this point is not
dealt with in his discussion. Davidson’s argument therefore does not in the end
refute his critics. It shows merely the explanatory and not the causal relevance of
mental properties in respect to physical events; provided we interpret the relation of
supervenience as a simultaneous, non-causal relation. Kim (1989: 270, Fn 8) is right
to emphasize the harmony between property-epiphenomenalism and WS. The same
is true also for SS. A physical duplicate of our world without the mental is
nomologically  possible  from our point of view given WS. It is also nomologically
possible in light of SS but not from our point of view because no psychophysical
regularities that are  laws of nature in our world are included. Davidson (1993)
therefore overestimates the explanatory power of  supervenience relations. They are
in harmony with different views of mental causality like in the approaches of type-
identity, epiphenomenality and emergentism. 
Davidson sets himself two goals: the proof of mental causality and a theory of
non-reductive physicalism. The first road we find in his causal explanation by
primary reasons: “. . . beliefs and desires have causal powers, and that is why they
explain actions” (Davidson 1987: 44). The second is expressed among other things
in the thesis that in his view mental properties must supervene only over such
physical properties that are required “for a complete causal account of the universe”
(Davidson 1993: 17, Fn. 12). Yet if we make just this assumption, the causal role of
mental properties becomes dubious. We cannot ascribe causal forces to such
properties without allowing systematic overdetermination except they could be
reduced to forces of subvenient physical properties. This would be a considerable
restriction of MA because only the categorical features of mental properties would be
non-reducable.
1 But what should they be if in Davidson’s philosophy internal
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Complete physical explanations do not wipe away our interest for mental
concepts: “But if mental concepts are not reducible to physical concepts, there is no
reason to suppose we would lose interest in explanations in mental terms just because
we had a complete physical explanation. What is true, of course, is that psychological
explanations are never full and sufficient; like most explanations, they are interest-
sensitive, and simply assume that a vast number of (unspecified and unspecifiable)
factors that might have intervened between cause and effect did not.” (Davidson
1993: 16, our italics) We agree with this because explanations of actions by primary
reasons are  simpler and more comprehensible as neuronal explanations. Making
behavior intelligible such explanations work well in most cases. Yet we do not see
that under physicalistic premisses explanations by primary reasons are causal
explanations. Summing up it follows from these considerations that  also Davidson
failed in outlining a consistent synthesis of mental causality with non-reductive
physicalism. 
Davidson deems AM+P+WS to be a consistent set of sentences. But this is
questionable under specific conditions. Let us make the following assumptions: e is
a mental event of a person a with the mental property M. It is caused at time t by the
physical event c with the physical property P. The whole physical state e* of a is
caused at t by the complex physical cause c*. The course of the physical happenings
is governed by strict deterministic laws. The properties P and M are governed by a
non strict law that only allows probabilistic predictions. At a later time t’ there is the
same constellation of causes like that at t. Then it is possible that P causes a property
M’ different from M (we use the abridged manner of speaking in (i)).  If we assume
WS then the mental difference must correlate with a physical difference in the
organism of a. The mental anomalism generates a physiological anomalism. But this
contradicts the assumption of deterministic physical laws. The objection is obvious
that the constellation of causes at t and t’ can not be the same. M’ is itself not caused
by P but by a different property P’ and in correspondence the physical state of a
changed by a different pattern of causes. But in this case psychophysical
generalizations would be strict and only for a limited human mind be CP-laws. This
resembles Fodor’s view but is in conflict with MA, if we interpret the principle of
charity ontologically, that is, if we assume that there is an essential difference
between mental and physical phenomenons. Fodor believes intentional laws can be
approximated to strict laws in the progress of science by successive explication of CP-
conditions. But for MA such laws are even  in the long run only “rude rules of
thumb” (Davidson 1970: 219).
Davidson has answered his critics (1993: 9, 14) that they do not take into
account the distinction between strict and CP-laws. For him this distinction is
essential. He refers to his theory of action  wherein CP-laws play a significant role.24 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1  Davidson speaks in this article of a graduation of AM: “The extent to which mental
concepts fall short of being reducible to physical concepts measures the degree of
anomaly.” (1993: 11).
Therefore we assume, following Kim (1993c: 24), that in Davidson (1993) also the
strategy of the enlarged nomological reasoning is applied. Moreover this is suggested
by him pretending the compatibility of Fodor’s views  concerning intentional CP-
laws and even Kim’s local reduction of mental properties (1996: 233seqq.) with AM
+ P in this article.
1 In view of Fodor this contrasts with the considerations above.
The same is true with regard to Kim. Furthermore for Kim (1998: 97seq.) the
functionalization of properties or concepts is a necessary condition of their reduction.
Then the question arises whether and in what way intentional properties (concepts)
can be functionalized within AM + P. As far as we know Davidson does not discuss
this question. Besides these difficulties and problems CclW cannot be harmonized
with mental causation of physical events as shown in 2 (a). 
3. Are Mental Properties real or unreal (fictive)? 
In our analyses we have presupposed the reality of mental properties. Yet Davidson
(1993: 4, Fn. 4) does not distinguish between properties and predicates respectively
concepts without offering a new solution for the problem of universals beyond well-
known views. Rather it is a matter of apparent leveling of realist, nominalist or
conceptualist interpretations of predicates. This has a crucial consequences for the
problem of mental causation because the problem does not emerge in the second
alternative. Davidson’s wavering usage of the terms seems to give him advantages in
his roll out of arguments.  He accepts properties in case it  is plausible, in particular
to give us reasons for mental causality (see in this part 2.). On the other hand he can
easily reject that objection of property-epiphenomenalism by its reformulation using
the expressions “concept” and “description”. This means events are only governed by
causal relations if we describe them with physical concepts. Of course, this linguistic
creation of causal relations is not in harmony with Davidson’s ontological
understanding of causality. But the reformulation is a thorough misunderstanding of
the objection which concerns properties that are really in the  world independent of
our thinking and conceptualization and not concepts or predicates built in our
languages. Kim clearly distinguishes both (1998: 103seq.). 
The objection of property-epiphenomenalism would be unjustified if Davidson
rejects  properties (universals or tropes) and classes (in Armstrong’s terminology such
a position is called predicate or concept nominalism, 1978: 12seq.). Some authorsAnomalous Monism and Mental Causality 25
1  In his view Davidson’s proposal here can be characterized in the following manner: 
“Davidson certainly does not hold the semantic view (of predicates, the authors): the
semantic role of a predicate, on his account, is exhausted by its contribution to the T-
theorems flowing from an acceptable T-theory for a language to which the predicate
belongs.” (Neale 2001: 67; on Davidson and realism 64-71)
interpret Davidson’s views along these lines. This  seems also coherent with some of
Davidson’s remarks on the subject. Therefore his   view on the ontological status of
properties is for McLaughlin (1989: 122) “far from certain”. Sosa (1993: 48-9)
considers a realist and nominalist interpretation. S. Neale (1999: 84, 2001: 39 seq.,
66 seq.) presupposes in Davidson’s philosophy a sparse ontology of things and events
without properties and states of affairs that is sufficient for his interpretive theory of
truth.
1 Davidson himself (1994: 231) has characterized AM + P as “ontological
monism coupled with conceptual dualism”: “The mental and the physical share
ontologies, but not, if I am right, classificatory concepts” (1990: 18).  The same events
seem to be therefore only physical or mental when classified and described within
different linguistic frameworks.  Such a view is not based  on an ontological dualism
of properties. It is governed – in the interpretation of N. Melchert (1986: 271) –  by
specifiying a priori principles of the physical and mental system of descriptions. They
also determine what is “real”: “. . . if by “really” you mean “apart from all
descriptions”, there is not and cannot be any answer . . .” (271). 
To understand Davidson in such a way resembles R. Carnap’s entrenchment of
different ontologies in linguistic frameworks. Only within frameworks the content of
experiences (208) can be described and only within these we can ask what is real and
what is not. Such frameworks are underdetermined by the content of experience.
Therefore the same content can be interpreted within several frameworks and
choosing between them for different purposes is determined especially by pragmatical
features of simplicity, usefulness and fruitfulness. Consequently different ontologies
do not exclude one another. 
Carnap (1963: 885-86) takes advantage of this possibility in some remarks on the
mind-body problem. He prefers a physicalist language/ontology, but a dualist
language/ontology  is not excluded. Such a language would surely be helpful to
satisfy the mentioned features for our commonsense  communication. An ontological
non-reductive physicalism cannot solve the problem of psychophysical causality as
downward causation because it is not in harmony with CclW. This difficulty can be
eliminated with the help of linguistic frameworks in an elegant manner. The
problem does not arise in linguistic physicalism because the identification of mental
and physical properties which is based on empirical correlations. In a dualist ontology
we could entrench the possibility of psychophysical interaction by giving specific
principles for the underlying framework even in the presence of the same content of26 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
experience. Then CclW could be interpreted as an idealization, like, for example, the
concept of mass points which in our world can be realized only approximately. 
However, such a linguistic-pluralistic solution of the psychophysical problem and
the problem of mental causality is not consistent with the whole context of
Davidson’s philosophy. It conflicts with  the myth of the third dogma of empiricism,
that is, the dualism between conceptual schemes and  empirical content (Davidson
1974a). Moreover Davidson understands causality and identity as relations
independent of our descriptions, as part of the furniture of the world (Davidson
1970: 215, 1974: 243). The same is true for place-time-determinations. If all other
physical concepts would merely result from of our interpretations without any
foundation in re we could characterize Davidson’s concept of events like A. Skillen
(1984: 523) as “hopelessly minimal”. This also would contrast with the critique of
the third empiristic dogma. Merely things and events governed by causal relations
would take the place of an uninterpreted content of experience. Yet this view is
hardly compatible with Davidson’s realist understanding of physics. We could not
say like he does: “that things in themselves are physical” (523).
Therefore one can ask, is it reasonable to assume in Davidson’s ontology besides
things and events also physical and mathematical but not mental attributes or classes?
 Like in a nominalist ontology of neutral particulars the difficulties with mental
causality would be eliminated. We could also stick to the characterization of
“ontological monism and conceptual dualism”. In this version of a conceptual
dualism only particular physical predicates were grounded ontologically. Yet, these do
not refer to properties, relations or classes uniquely which would be incompatible
with the inscrutability of reference which Davidson (1979) accepts essentially. Some
remarks point to the view that he accepts the physicalist ontology under
consideration, for example, when he states “the mental is not an ontological but a
conceptual category” (Davidson 1987: 46). And this conceptual idiom, that is, our
intentional vocabulary, is merely built from us without any objective foundation. If
not, Davidson could not write: “The limit thus placed on the social science is set not
by nature, but by us when we decide to view men as rational agents with goals and
purposes, and as subject to moral evaluation.” (1974: 239). In contrast physical
predicates would refer to properties, relations or classes as constituents of structures
in the world. 
Also some interpreters of Davidson favor a physicalist ontology that is purified
from all mentality.  Melchert (1986: 272seq.), for example, writes in his further
considerations: “So also one event can be a thought and a brain process, without
supposing that there is “really” a thought-property distinct from a brain-process-
property, each of them properties of some third (what?) thing. There are no mental
properties in the world distinct from the physical properties there” (273). SkillenAnomalous Monism and Mental Causality 27
(1984: 523) interprets the mental phenomenons in AM+P as a teleological construct
we built on a physical basis. For him “Davidson is an empirical idealist but a
transcendental physicalist.” Yet if the mental is an interpretative superstructure this
would result in an ontological fiction because our recognition of reality is exclusively
the task of natural science. We could call this position a moderate ontological
eliminativism; “moderate” because it does not deny the mental phenomena plainly,
for example, like the reality of phlogiston or demons, but it conceives them as  mere
results of interpretations without any value for theoretical knowledge.
Yet an eliminative or fictional interpretation of the mental is not in harmony
with other parts of Davidson’s philosophy.
1. Davidson (1997: 72-73) agrees with Quine’s thesis of the indetermination  of
translation, but  he turns against D. Dennett and also Quine himself who have
therefore  doubts as to the reality of propositional attitudes. He also objects against
Dennett’s identification of intentional states with abstract patterns of behavior which
reduces the very complex physical situation to a comprehensible set of properties.
Between abstract entities there are no causal relations but between beliefs, desires and
the like. Dennett complains about the full reality of intentional states within
Davidsons position, yet this is something he welcomes (81).
2. We have to mention again explaining actions means for Davidson that primary
reasons have a causal  power. He connects the ideas of  cause and rationality: “A
reason is a rational cause” (1974: 233). It cannot mean that such reasons are merely
fictions. Mental properties are a part of the world. They cannot be eliminated and
cannot be localized in a superstructure of fictive constructs. This is obvious  because
it is claimed that in AM the mental events are no less real as physical events (1997:
72). In contrast, within a fictional understanding of the mental even Davidsons’s
theory of action would be a commonsense fiction without truth. Instead of the
problem of psychophysical causation other problems would then emerge, for
example, the problem to explain mental fictions and their illusionary realistic
interpretation by commonsense.
3. A further evidence for the assumption of mental properties are Davidson’s
analyses (1991) of  self knowledge, the knowledge of others and the triangulation of
both in a shared world. The ascription of propositional attitudes to other persons in
the triangle is not a projection of fictions to them that  constitute other intentional
beings in this way. It is presupposed that other persons must have such attitudes
already which correspond mostly with my own ascriptions. Therefore, these are true
in most cases. Self ascription is not based on empirical evidence. The origin of self
ascription is also not fictive intentionality or authority: I know my attitudes because
I have them. Mental properties are no less real than physical properties and are28 Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer
1  The article is a shorter english version of the chapter “Anomaler Monismus und mentale
Kausalität. Ein Beitrag zur Debatte über Donald Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen” of
the book: E. Rogler, G. Preyer, Materialismus, anomaler Monismus und mentale Kausalität.
Zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Geistes bei D. Davidson und D. Lewis. Frankfurt am
Main: Verlag Humanities-Online 2001 www.humanities-online.de The German version
includes a broader discussion of the principles of anomalous monism and it contains an
additional part on singular causal statements.
We are indebted to Frank Siebelt for his very helpful comments on earlier drafts of the
article.
therefore not only components of a merely fictive superstructure. Therefore
Davidson says that “all three varieties of knowledge are concerned with aspects of the
same reality . . .” (1991: 153). These varieties of knowledge cannot be reduced to
one another but condition each other mutually. Because self knowledge and
knowledge of other minds presuppose the reality of mental properties their denial
would mean an annihilation of all knowledge and communication. 
We have convincing reasons for the acceptance of mental properties in
Davidson’s theory of the mental. Its usual characterization as an ontological monism
and a conceptual (ideological) dualism is therefore at least misleading. It would be
conclusive to characterize his theory as an ontological monism of events (respectively
things) and a psychophysical dualism of properties that corresponds epistemologically to a
dualism of concepts- and  descriptions. But such an interpretation is confronted with
the problem of mental causality. There seem to be only two consistent versions to
solve this problem within AM+P. We could uphold physicalism with CclW. But this
is not in harmony with psychophysical downward causation. Thereby it is not
excluded that mental properties could be explanatory relevant, if we assume special
laws of supervenience. The second option would be to accept such a form of
causality.  But this would require a revision of other theses, for example, a weakening
of  NC. Davidson’s philosophy of the mental would then be a version of
emergentism. Presumably this is not his intention. His solution of  that dilemma by
assuming supervenient causality of the mental turned out to be not convincing.
Summing up:  we see the main problem for Davidson’s philosophy of the mental in
the proposal to construct a consistent synthesis between a sufficiently strong
physicalism and his wish to keep the autonomy of the mental, a synthesis which is
hard to achieve.
1  
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